Western New England Law Review
Volume 4 4 (1981-1982)
Issue 4

Article 3

1-1-1982

MASSACHUSETTS WETLANDS AND
FLOODPLAINS REVISTED
Alexandra D. Dawson

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Alexandra D. Dawson, MASSACHUSETTS WETLANDS AND FLOODPLAINS REVISTED, 4 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 623 (1982),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol4/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

MASSACHUSETTS WETLANDS AND
FLOODPLAINS REVISITED
ALEXANDRA D. DAWSON·

I.

INTRODUCTION

With the passage of the Jones Act l in 1963, Massachusetts be
came the first state in the nation to protect wetlands by specific stat
ute. Communities simultaneously were developing bylaws to protect
wetlands and floodplains under the implied powers of the Zoning
Enabling Act. 2 Almost two decades of experience have generated a
number oflegal decisions 3 of interest to states that have enacted laws
specifically protecting coastal wetlands4 and freshwater wetlands,5
and to states that have, or are working on, plans under the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972.6
* B.A., Barnard College; J.D., Harvard University. The author is presently Direc
tor, Resource Management and Administration Program, Antioch New England Gradu
ate School and Executive Director, Water Supply Citizens Advisory Committee.
1. Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 426, § 27A, 1963 Mass. Acts 240 (repealed 1972).
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, §§ 1-17 (West 1979).
3. E.g., MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 369 Mass. 512, 340 N.E.2d 487 (1976),
Christoffels v. Alton Properties, Inc., 362 Mass. 862, 285 N.E.2d 453 (1972); Turnpike
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied,409
U.S. 1108 (1973); Attorney General v. Baldwin, 361 Mass. 199, 279 N.E.2d 710 (1972);
Golden v. Board of Selectmen, 358 Mass. 519, 265 N.E.2d 573 (1970); MacGibbon v.
Board of Appeals, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); Bay State Lobster Co. v. Perini
Corp., 355 Mass. 794, 245 N.E.2d 759 (1969); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S.
Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104,206 N.E.2d 666 (1965); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals,
347 Mass. 690, 200 N.E.2d 254 (1964).
4. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-28 to -45 (West 1975); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6601-6620,7001-7013 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-4709
(1974) (repealed 1975); MD. NAT. REC. CODE ANN. §§ 718-731 (Supp. 1970) (repealed
1973); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to -69 (Supp. 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 483
A:l to -5 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9A-l to -10 (West 1979); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV.
LAW §§ 25-0101 to -0601 (McKinney Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-230 (1978);
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 541.605 to -665 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 2-1-13 to -18 (1976);
and VA. CeOE §§ 62.1-13.1,62.1-13.5 to -6, 62.1-13.20 (1982).
5. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-36 to -45 (West 1975); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN: §§ 483-A:l to -5 (1968); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 24-0101 to -0705
(McKinney Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 2-1-19 to -25, (1976 and Supp. 1981).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452-1464 (1976). Of35 eligible states and territories, 19 have ap
proved plans as of 1979. For a general overview of federal, state and local laws on this
subject, see Dawson, Land Use Implications of Wetlands and Floodplain Regulation, 2
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This article is intended to complement and update Protecting
Massachusetts Wetlands,7 a lengthy study of the Massachusetts stat
utes and decisions on wetlands and floodplains prior to 1978, with a
discussion of cases from other states and an analysis of the impact of
federal law. It focuses on cases decided by the Massachusetts Ap
peals Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the
intervening years, with reference to two important recent decisions
from other jurisdictions.
The decisions reported since 1978 further illuminate specific is
sues: The degree to which a town can protect floodplains through
zoning bylaws;8 whether Massachusetts communities may protect
wetlands through home rule nonzoning bylaws;9 and the complexi
ties of the Commonwealth's Wetlands Protection Act (WPA).l0 The
first decision under the Commonwealth's Inland Wetlands Restric
tion Act of 1968 (IWRA)ll and further rulings on the public trust in
tidal lands 12 are also discussed.
II.

A

BRIEF REVIEW OF THE MASSACHUSETTS STATUTORY
STRUCTURE AND PREVIOUS DECISIONS

The Commonwealth rejoices in three statutes governing altera
tion of wetlands. The Coastal Wetlands Restriction Act of 1965
(CWRA)13 and the IWRA are prospective in operation. Each law
permits the state Department of Environmental Management to map
important coastal l4 and inland IS wetlands and, after notice and hear
ings, to record restrictive orders limiting alteration of the land. The
two laws permit appeal of the order, within ninety days from record
ing, on constitutional grounds of excessive restriction. 16 Many such
appeals have been filed, although the first decision of the supreme
ZONING AND PLANNING L. REPORT 178-82, 185-90. For a much briefer treatment, see
McGregor & Dawson, Wetlands and Floodplain Protection, 64 MASS. L. REv. 73 (1979).
7. Dawson, Protecting Massachusetts Wetlands, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 755 (1978).
8~ See notes 47-65 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 114-34 infra and accompanying text.
10. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West 1974 & Supp. 1982\ see notes 78
113 infro and accompanying text.
11. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40A (West Supp. 1982); see notes 135-49
infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 150-69 infra and accompanying text.
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 105 (West Supp. 1982).
14. Id. ch. 130, § 105.
15. Id. ch. 131, § 4OA.
16. Id. & ch. 130, § 105.
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judicial court on these laws did not come down until 1981. 17 Due to
budget constraints, the prospective laws have not been used exten
sively, except in some coastal areas.
The more familiar law, the WPA or Hatch Act, requires no ad
vance state action; the WPA simply declares that no person shall fill,
dredge, remove, or alter any defined coastal or inland wetland with
out a permit from the local conservation commission or from the
state Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) on
appeal. 18 Because wetlands are defined to include "lands subject to
flooding," the WPA also protects floodplains.
The WPA is an outgrowth of the Jones Act and a companion
law passed in 1965 that requires a state permit for filling or dredging
inland wetlands. 19 The laws were repealed and combined into the
WPA in 1972; and original jurisdiction was shifted from the state to
the local conservation commissions. 20 Thousands of hearings are
held annually under the WPA and about ten percent of the local
decisions are appealed. Considering the scope and familiarity of the
law, surprisingly few court decisions have been rendered. This is
because the series of local and state hearings provide an extensive
forum. Recently, however, two appeals court cases have been
decided. 21
Municipalities in Massachusetts have long protected wetlands,
especially floodplains, through local ordinances and bylaws adopted
under the Zoning Act22 or, more recently under the home rule
amendment,23 as general ordinances or bylaws not requiring the
complex procedures needed for adopting or amending zoning
17. Moskow v. Commissioner of Environmental Management, 1981 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 2134,427 N.E.2d 750. Moskow is discussed at text accompanying notes 135-45 infra.
18. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1982).
19. Act of Mar. 29,1965, ch. 220, § 117 C, 1965 Mass. Acts 116 (repealed 1972).
20. For regulations adopted under the law, see 310 CODE MAss. REGS. 10.00
(1980); 45 Mass. Reg. 1-36 (1977).
21. The two cases, Town of Rutiand v. Fife, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 308, 416
N.E.2d 518, rev'tJ, 385 Mass. 1001 (1982) and Hamilton v. Conservation Comm'n, 1981
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1521,425 N.E.2d 358 are discussed at text accompanying notes
78-104 infra.
22. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4OA, §§ 1-17 (West 1979 & Supp. 1981).
23. MASS. CONST. amend. art. II. Prior to the adoption of the home rule amend
ment, Massachusetts cities and towns were subject to the complete control of the General
Court. Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm'n, 363 Mass. 339, 355-56, 294
N.E.2d 393, 407-08 (1973). The home rule amendment grants cities or towns independ
ent legislative powers as well as any power or function which the general court has power
to confer upon it, provided that it is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted
by the legislature, nor denied by its own charter. MAss. CONST. amend. art. II § 6.
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codes. 24 These local efforts were supported by the requirements of
the federal flood insurance program, which mandates that participat
ing communities regulate use of the hundred-year floodplain
through local enactments. 25 Recent cases have tested three such zon
ing bylaws and one nonzoning bylaw. 26
Of the numerous wetlands and floodplains cases decided before
1978,27 four are of greatest interest. In Commissioner ofNatural Re
sources v. S. Volpe & Co. ,28 the first to interpret the WPA, the issue
was whether denying a permit allowing filling of a march for the
construction of residences was such a deprivation of the practical
uses of the landowner's property as to constitute a taking. 29 The
court held that a regulation which goes "too far" is an impermissible
taking without compensation. 30 The application of the test was in
conclusive in Volpe because the case was remanded for findings, and
the decision of the superior court on remand was not appealed. Ref
erence to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,3l however, indicated a
conservative tendency in defining public regulatory power. 32
The conservative point of view was given clearer, though not
definitive expression in MacGibbon v. Board ofAppeals (MacGibbon
I, 11 & Ill) ,33 in which a prohibition against fill in seven acres of
coastal wetlands was held to be confiscatory because it left the owner
no "practical use" of his land.34 In denying rehearing, however, the
MacGibbon III court stated specifically that, as the case was decided
under the Zoning Enabling Act, the decisions had no relation to the
WPA.35 Further, the court stated that its decision did not "discuss or
24. General bylaws are adopted under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 21 (West
1958 and Supp. 1981).
25. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1976). For
regulations pertaining to the Act, see 44 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-60.26 (1980).
26. F or a discussion of these cases, see notes 47-76 infra and accompanying text.
27. :For a discU$ion of these cases, see Dawson, supra note 7.
28. 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
29. Id at 107,206 N.E.2d at 669.
30. Id at 110, 206 N.E.2d at 670 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922».
31. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
32 References to Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), or to Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) usually indicate a more liberal
approach.
33. MacGibbon III, 369 Mass. 512, 340 N.E.2d 487 (1975), reh'g denied, 369 Mass.
523, 344 N.E.2d 185 (1976); MacGibbon II, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970);
MacGibbon I, 347 Mass. 690,200 N.E.2d 254 (1964).
34. MacGibbon Ill, 369 Mass. at 517, 340 N.E.2d at 490-91.
35. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 369 Mass. 523, 524-25, 344 N.E.2d 185, 186
87 (1979).
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decide any constitutional issue whatever."36
It should be noted that the MacGibbon triad involved that bug
bear of land regulators, a situation in which all of the landowner's
property is strictly regulated and rendered economically unusable.
In upholding regulation in other cases, courts have found the poten
tial for residual or accessory use of the regulated area, an issue which
appears in several cases discussed below. 37 While Volpe did not in
volve considerable upland acreage, the case failed to recognize the
importance of the accessory use issue. As a result, the issue of the
trial was limited to the effects of filling the coastal wetland. There
was no discussion of whether the marsh had value for minor acces
sory uses to the adjacent uplands in the same ownership.38
In Golden v. Board oj" Selectmen,39 the court established that lo
cal regulation was not preempted by the state laws covering wet
lands.40 The court held that state law would be preemptive only if
the local bylaw was "repugnant to ... [or] inconsistent with" the
state scheme.41
Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town oj" Dedham 42 is a leading case on
floodplain restriction. Although Turnpike Realty concerned a local
floodplain protection bylaw, the court's reasoning applies equally
well to any level of wetlands regulation. The opinion contains broad
language supporting regulation of floodplains and emphasizes the
hazards in permitting their uncontrolled development. 43 The total
loss-of-practical-use problem did not arise in Turnpike Realty be
cause the landowner had not investigated development possibilities
of two areas that rose above the floodplain. 44 Turnpike Realty
clearly governs the three most recent Massachusetts floodplain
cases.4S
III.

RECENT CASES

The basic issue evident in most of the recent Massachusetts
cases is one of taking: the amount of environmental regulation of
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 524, 344 N.E.2d at 186.
See Dawson, supra note 7, at 790-92.
349 Mass. at 110-11,206 N.E.2d at 671.
358 Mass. 519, 265 N.E.2d 573 (1970).
Id. at 524, 526, 265 N.E.2d at 576, 577.
Id. at 524, 265 N.E.2d at 576.
362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
Id. at 227-29, 233-35, 284 N.E.2d at 895-96, 899.
Id. at 223, 235-36, 284 N.E.2d at 893, 899-900.
See text accompanying notes 47-65 infra.
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private property without compensation that is permissible under the
state and federal constitutions.46 The constitutional test in Massa
chusetts appears to be one of balancing. The public hazard con
trolled by the regulation is balanced against the burden inflicted on
the landowner. Turnpike Realty continues to be the governing case,
but MacGibbon III may have an impact on subsequent cases in
which the landowner asserts that the government restriction has de- .
prived him of the practical use of his remaining land. Additionally,
Turnpike Realty seems to have made the courts comfortable with the
regulation of floodplains even in situations where the exact degree of
hazard has not been ascertained.
A.

Three Attempted Incursions into the Floodplain

During 1979 and 1980, the Massachusetts Appeals Court ren
dered three decisions interpreting local floodplain protection bylaws.
In Subaru of New England, Inc. v. Board ofAppeals,47 the town de
nied plaintiff a special permit to place fill along the Neponset River.
The fill would have resulted in a loss of fifteen acre feet of flood
water storage capacity.48 Testimony indicated'that this loss would
result in a rise of one quarter of an inch in the flood stage of the river
related to the maximum area of the floodplain zone. 49 The trial
court found the effect minimal and concluded that the town acted
unreasonably and arbitrarily in refusing to grant Subaru a permit. so
In reversing the trial court, the appeals court held that as "reason
able persons could differ as to the severity of danger from flooding
... the board's decision was not arbitrary and must prevail."Sl
Thus, because the local board showed some basis for its decision, the
court refused to substitute its opinion for that of the board's.s2 The
court's decision in MacGibbon III directing the board to issue a per
mit was distinguished on the ground that in the case at bar, filling
would cause water to flow over the land of others, not merely the
landowner's property. 53 The opinion shows a distinct disposition to
follow Turnpike Realty rather than the MacGibbon reasoning.
46. See Volpe, 349 Mass. at 107-10,206 N.E.2d at 669-70.
47. 8 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 395 N.E.2d 880 (1979).
48. Id at 485, 395 N.E.2d at 882.
49. Id at 485-86, 395 N.E.2d at 882. The rise of one quarter of an inch, however,
may have represented the rise to be expected if the entire floodplain of 825 acres were
filled, not plaintiffs 2.98 acres. Id at 486 n.4, 395 N.E.2d at 882 n.4.
50. Id at 486, 395 N.E.2d at 882.
51. Id at 488, 395 N.E.2d at 883.
52. Id, 395 N.E.2d at 883.
53. Id at 487 n.5, 395 N.E.2d at 882 n.5.
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In Turner v. Town of Walpole, 54 the appeals court summarily
upheld the floodplain bylaw of Walpole against a claim that it was
confiscatory as applied to the landowner. 55 What is interesting about
the case is that Judge Kass declared that Turnpike Realty, cited six
times in his brief opinion, clearly governed, although the Walpole
bylaw lacked any provision for individual review of applications to
build residential or commercial buildings. 56 In effect, special permits
were available only for industrial uses. The court felt that this was a
reasonable distinction. It is not clear from the opinion what zoning
governed plaintiffs property. The case, however, appeared to
demonstrate that the availability of the special permit procedure,
greatly emphasized in Turnpike Realty,57 may not be constitutionally
required.
The third decision, also written by Judge Kass, upheld denial by
the Concord Board of Appeals of a special permit to fill land in the
floodplain of the Assabet River. In S. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust v.
Board ofAppeals, 58 the trial court found that the proposed filling of
an old canal in the floodplain would have a number of adverse
effects:
[T]he proposed filling of a canal by the plaintiff would defeat the
drainage function which the canal served; the velocity of water
flow over a dam in the Assabet River would be increased such that
erosion of an existing dam, washing out of existing fill and a
change in the course of the Assabet River were likely; compensa
tory water storage in the locus would be reduced; the land of
others would be adversely affected; and filling the upstream end of
the canal would contribute to stagnation and pollution in the
downstream unfilled end, causing detriment to the public health. 59

In view of the findings, the result was to be expected. The decision,
however, is interesting for its treatment of the taking issue. Plaintiff
asserted that it was left with no practical use of its property.60 The
court declared that, after Turnpike Realty, ''the prospects for the
plaintiffs assault on this score are meager. That decision forecloses
the argument that the exceedingly limited use which a flood plain
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1745,409 N.E.2d 807.
Id at 1745, 409 N.E.2d at 808.
Id at 1746, 409 N.E.2d at 808.
362 Mass. at 230,284 N.E.2d at 897.
1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 637,402 N.E.2d 100.
59. Id at 639-40, 402 N.E.2d at 102. The court remarked that "(t]his sampling of
the judge's findings does not exhaust his compilation of what was likely to go wrong if
the plaintiff obtained the permit it wanted." Id at 640, 402 N.E.2d at 102.
60. Id at 641, 402 N.E.2d at 103.
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zoning by-law may leave to the owner of land constitutes a de facto
taking."61 Plaintiff pointed out that the trial judge himself had
found that plaintiff could not use its land in its present condition for
any of the uses permitted within the Flood Plain Conservancy Dis
triCt. 62 The trial judge, however, also had found "that the plaintiffs
land was not worthless. . ..."63 The appeals court speculated that it
was "by no means clear from the record that the plaintiff could not
use that portion of its land in the flood plain zone for some purpose
which did not require filling, for example to enhance that portion of
its land which is outside the flood plain."64 Although the town suc
ceeded on that conjecture, the decision provides a useful caution on
the importance of introducing evidence at trial regarding the pres
ence or absence of some kind of "residual economic utility."65 Mas
sachusetts courts are not yet ready to uphold regulation on the basis
of hazard alone, in the face of total depreciation of value.
A recent New Hampshire case offers an instructive contrast to
the three Massachusetts floodplain cases. In Burrows v. City of
Keene,66 the New Hampshire Supreme Court struck down designa
tion of plaintiffs property as an unbuildable "conservation district"
, and required payment of damages in inverse condemnation to com
pensate plaintiff for the loss of value during the period of overregula
tion. 67 The strongly worded opinion discusses the history of
American and English constitutional law, describing the protection
in the New Hampshire Constitution against a regulatory taking68 as
"a principle that lies at the very foundation of civilized society as we
know it."69 The instructive facts illustrate the regulatory debacle in
volved in the case. Although the subject area was located in an envi
ronmentally sensitive area, no mention of this was made as a basis
for regulation. The planning board, however, in considering the
proposed subdivision, opined that the land "should be protected as a
wilderness area."70 Further, the city, in attempting to buy the land,
refused to pay more than 27,900 dollars, although the property had
been purchased for almost twice that amount and was assessed at
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
121 N.H. 590,432 A.2d 15 (1981).
Id. at 601, 432 A.2d at 22.
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. II.
121 N.H. at 595, 432 A.2d at 18.
121 N.H. at 600, 432 A.2d at 21.
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41,406 dollars. 71 The conclusion was, to the court, inescapable:

Rather than regulating land of unique value72 so as to prevent in
jury to others, the city was merely "attempting to obtain for the pub
lic the benefit of having this land remain undeveloped as open space
without paying for that benefit in the constitutional manner."73
Any visible intent to exercise the police power so as to retain
developable land in a natural condition almost always is fatal in
cases involving taking. For example, in Aronson v. Sharon ,74 large
lot zoning was struck down on the basis of such a stated intent;
whereas in a later case, lots of similar size were upheld on a showing
of public health concerns. 75 The implications are all the worse if the
community has previously considered buying the land for open
space and turns to regulation when the sale falls through. 76

B.

Two Tests of Procedures Under the WPA

From a simple regulatory law, the WPA has grown to a lengthy
statute, filed with Latin definitions and administrative procedures,
and governed by complex and detailed regulations. 77 The pitfalls of
its interpretation are considerable and are demonstrated in two re
cent cases concerning the towns of Rutland and Orleans. These
cases reflect the complexities of the language and procedure of the
WPA, rather than constitutional verities.
In Town of Rutland v. F![e,78 the only real legal issue was
whether the land on which defendant Fife wanted to build was a
wetland as defined in the statute. 79 The only evidence the town pro
duced at trial that touched upon the criteria for a protected wetland
'Was a letter from an environmental consultant and registered sani
tarian. 80 Because the letter failed to mirror the language of the WPA
regarding the level of the water table or the incidence of wetland
71. Id. at 594, 432 A.2d at 17.
72. Id. at 601, 432 A.2d at 21 (distinguishing Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336
A.2d 239 (1975) in which the court upheld a prohibition on the filling of a coastal
saltmarsh).
73. 121 N.H. at 600, 432 A.2d at 21.
74.. 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964).
75. Wilson v. Town of Sherborn, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 326 N.E.2d 922 (1975); see
also Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40
N.J. 539, 541, 193 A.2d 232, 234 (1963).
76. See Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 544, 193 A.2d 232, 235 (1963); Dawson, supra note 7, at 772-74.
77. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West 1974 and Supp. 1982).
78. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 308,416 N.E.2d 518.
79. ld. at 309, 416 N.E.2d at 519.
80. ld. at 312-13, 416 N.E.2d at 521.
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plants, the appeals court granted summary judgement, holding that
the letter fell short of establishing that the land was a wetland. 81 The
message here for conservation commissions and town attorneys is
very clear. The court also struggled with the meaning of the statu
tory requirement that a subject wetland border on surface water. 82
The court stated that the definition of "bordering" in the regulations
leaves the reader "mired in hopeless circularity ..."83 in that it de
fines bordering as including land "within '100 feet horizontally land
ward from the bank of any . . . swamp bordering the . . . pond
. . . .'''84 Judge Kass dealt with the circularity by deciding that a
wetland is subject to the law if any portion of it lies within one hun
dred feet of a pond, ocean, estuary, creek, river, stream, lake, or land
subject to tidal action and other flooding, whereas a wetland beyond
this expanded version of a bank is not subject to the law. 85 Fife
marks the first judicial attempt at reconciling the statutory and regu
latory definitions of the bordering jurisdiction. 86 On appeal, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined that the disputed
letter was "sufficiently substantial. . . to raise an apparent issue of
fact" and remanded the case for trial. 87
Hamilton v. Conservation Commission of Or/eans 88 also was de
cided on a single legal point. Plaintiff Hamilton, dissatisfied with the
decision of the local conservation commission regarding her applica
tion to build a house by Cape Cod Bay, appealed to the DEQE.89
The DEQE made a de novo decision under the WPA following an
adjudicatory hearing. 9o Similar to the local conservation commis
sion, the DEQE prohibited the proposed work unless the work was
to be constructed on pilings, without a revetment, and with no work
seaward of twenty feet from the mean high water mark. 91 Claiming
that the conservation commission's decision was confiscatory, plain
tiff neither sought judicial review within the thirty-day limit under
81. Id at 314, 416 N.E.2d at 522.
82. Id at 312, 416 N.E.2d at 520.
83. Id. at 310, 416 N.E.2d at 520.
84. Id (quoting 310 CODE MASS. REGS. 10.02(4)&(6) (1980».
85. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 311 & n.5, 416 N.E.2d 520 & n.5.
86. During informal discussions, members of the Massachusetts Association of
Conservation Commissions have indicated that most conservation commissions interpret
the regulation to mean that they may control activities within 100 feet from any wetland;
an area known as the "buffer zone."
87. 385 Mass. 1001, 1001, 433 N.E.2d 424, 424 (1982).
88. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1521,425 N.E.2d 358.
89. Id at 1522, 425 N.E.2d at 360.
90. Id at 1523-24, 425 N.E.2d at 361.
91. Id at 1524, 425 N.E.2d at 361-62.
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the State Administrative Procedures Act,92 nor did she elect to sue
the DEQE.93 Plaintiff instead sued the local conservation commis
sion in inverse condemnation for depriving her of all use of her
property.94 After a long discussion of the history of the WPA, the
court concluded that the WPA "reserves to the DEQE the power to
make the final decision on applications involving the specified con
cerns and to preserve thereby the statewide interest in the protection
of our wetlands."9s As the DEQE bears the liability for any taking,
the case was brought against the wrong party and, therefore, was
dismissed. 96
The court, however, did state that the plaintiff was able to seek
redress under the eminent domain law,97 which thus far had been
considered applicable only to actual takings of property for public
purposes. This theory of action has several implications. First, it
establishes an appeal period of two years from the date of the final
order. 98 The WPA states that "[n]o person shall remove, fill, dredge
or alter any [defined] wetland ... or any land subject to ... flood
ing . . . without receiving and complying with an order of condi
tions and provided all appeal periods have elapsed."99 Heretofore,
these appeal periods generally have been deemed to be the ten day
period after the local conservation commission has acted or failed to
act, or the thirty-day period under the State Administrative Proce
dures Act (APA)IOO after the issuance of a final, superseding order by
the DEQE. Thus, the question becomes whether Hamilton signifies
that no one may do work in a subject area for a full two years after a
state order is issued, for fear of a taking claim. If so, grave difficul
ties would be presented, as the orders on their face are good only for
a year. 101 The historical facts show an inadvertence: A provision
did appear in the WPA naming the APA as the sole remedy on ap
peal, but this provision was omitted when the law was subjected to a
total redrafting in 1974.102 The court, however, noted that during
92. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 14 (West 1979).
93. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1525, 425 N.E.2d at 362.
94. Id at 1522,425 N.E.2d at 360.
95. Id at 1531,425 N.E.2d at 365.
96. Id at 1532,425 N.E.2d at 366.
97. Id at 1534,425 N.E.2d at 366 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, §§ 16, 18
(West 1969».
98. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1534,425 N.E.2d at 367.
99. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
100. Id ch. 30A, §§ 14-17 (West 1979).
101. 310 CODE MASS. REGS. 10.06(4) (1980). An exception is made under 310
CODE MAss. REGS. 10.05(9) for dredging of ports.
102. Act of Aug. 13, 1974, ch. 818, § 40, 1974 Mass. Acts 834.
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the same legislative session a similar provision was placed into an
other environmental law. 103 By expressly including an exclusive
remedy provision in one law and excluding it from the WPA, the
court concluded that the legislature did not intend to limit the rem
edy under the WPA. 104
Hamilton not only extended the limitations period, it also sig
naled the abandonment of the standard of review under the APA,
which generally is limited to the question of whether the state agency
acted arbitrarily. lOS Finally, an action brought under the eminent
domain statute opens the door towards adoption of the new doctrine,
recently expressed in a United States Supreme Court minority opin
ion,I06 that an over-regulated landowner ought to be compensated in
cash and not merely by the removal of the restriction on the land. 107
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has adopted this doctrine in
Burrows. 108
C.

Protection

0/ Wetlands Through Local Home Rule Measures

Lovequist v. Conservation Commission 109 is interesting for two
reasons: Its broad statements on taking I10 and its holding that state
law does not preempt communities from adopting nonzoning "gen
eral" environmental protection ordinances and bylaws as well as
zoning controls. I II Although this kind of local bylaw is not included
in the statute listing permissible local measures, I12 the court upheld
it as authorized by the Commonwealth's home rule amendment. l13
After Golden, it was improbable that the Massachusetts courts
would find that the state scheme of wetlands controls preempted lo
cal controls. What was more uncertain, however, was the degree to
which the Zoning Act,114 and its predecessor the Zoning Enabling
Act, lIS might be construed as the exclusive means for regulating wet
103. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 39A (West Supp. 1982) (allowing local
conservation commissions to regulate "scenic mountains" in Berkshire County).
104. See 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1536-37, 425 N.E.2d at 368.
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 14(7)(g) (West 1979).
106. San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Bren
nan, J., dissenting).
107. Id at 658.
108. 121 N.H. at 598-99, 432 A.2d at 19-20.
109. 379 Mass. 7, 393 N.E.2d 858 (1979).
110. Id at 19-21, 393 N.E.2d at 866.
Ill. See id at 11-16, 393 N .E.2d at 861-64.
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 21 (West 1958 & Supp. 1982).
113. See 379 Mass. at 14-15,393 N.E.2d at 863.
114. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4OA, §§ 1-17 (West 1979).
115. Id §§ 1-22 (West 1968).
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lands or floodplains. In Rayco Investment Corp. v. Selectmen of
Raynham,116 the supreme judicial court disapproved the efforts of
that town to limit the number of trailers by a "general" nonzoning
bylaw, because the "nature and effect of the 1971 bylaw is that of an
exercise of the zoning power."117 The Rayco court also showed a
preference for the use of the zoning power in land use regulations
because of its comprehensiveness and the assorted protections it af
forded to landowners. lls
The Lovequist court distinguished Rayco on two grounds. First,
the town had not demonstrated a history of comprehensive wetlands
controls through a zoning bylaw; 119 and second, the bylaw mani
fested "neither the purpose nor the effects of a zoning regulation." 120
It did not prohibit or permit any particular uses of land, deny or
invite permission to build any structure, or regulate density.121 It
related only to wetlands values, not to other municipal concerns, and
regulated them on a case-by-case basis. 122 Having passed over this
hurdle, the court had no trouble finding that regulation by a nonzon
ing bylaw was as valid as regulation through zoning. 123 Plaintiff,
however, argued that the use of the local bylaw eliminated an appeal
to DEQE from a local decision under the WPA.124 The court made
short work of this argument. It stated that the aggrieved applicant
still had the right to judicial review in the nature of a writ of certio
rari.125 It should be noted that Golden did not raise the important
point that under the WPA the state agency has the last administra
tive word, whereas under a local bylaw the court directly reviews a
town decision. If Golden had not been decided first, an interesting
question arises as to whether the Lovequist court would have been
more sympathetic to the argument.
116. 368 Mass. 385, 331 N.E.2d 910 (1975).
117. Id at 392, 331 N.E.2d at 914.
118. Id at 393-94, 331 N.E.2d at 915. Presumably the court was referring to the
greater procedural requirements under the then Zoning Enabling Act, as well as to the
numerous exeniptions and limitations contained in the law. It is clear from Rayco that
the town, being unable to use its zoning to stop a plan for a trailer park because of the
exemption under the Zoning Enabling Act, tried to circumvent this limitation by using
the general bylaw power. Id
119. 379 Mass. at 14, 393 N.E.2d at 863.
120. Id at 13,393 N.E.2d at 862.
121. Id
122. Id at 13-16,393 N.E.2d at 863-64.
123. Id at 15, 393 N.E.2d at 863.
124. Id at 15, 393 N.E.2d at 863-64.
125. Id at 16, 393 N.E.2d at 864; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 249, § 4 (West
Supp. 1982).
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Lovequist involved denial of a permit to'put in a road over a
marshy neck in order to create access to twenty-six acres of up
land. 126 Building the road would have required removal of 6,000
cubic yards of peat, to be replaced with more permeable gravel. I27
The town conservation commission denied the application on the ba
sis of groundwater depletion and pollution. That is, removal of the
peat might act like "taking the plug out of a bathtub,"128 resulting in
a loss of groundwater. The court upheld the denial even though the
groundwater was not being used currently as a water supply.129
In rejecting plaintiffs taking claim, the Lovequist court stated
that a government decision may deprive an owner of even the most
beneficial use of property without rendering the action an unconsti
tutional taking. 130 The court noted that the only evidence of value
loss due to the restriction of use was a hearsay statement that plain
tiff had been offered 250,000 dollars for the property if it could be
developed. l3l In addition, the land had residual use for a single fam
ily house, a camp, or a cranberry bog. 132 Finally, the court pointed
out that as plaintiff had paid 38,200 dollars for the property which
recently had been appraised for 122,000 dollars, plaintiff would real
ize a gain of over two-hundred percent if he immediately sold the
property. \33 The manner and limits of these findings contain valua
ble lessons for attorneys on both sides of a taking case, particularly
the court's comment that "the plaintiffs themselves presented little
evidence of projected loss."134

D. First Impression of the Inland Wetlands Restriction Act
Moskow v. Commissioner of Environmental Management 135 is
the first decision under either the coastal l36 or the inland 137 wetlands
restriction laws. The opinion followed the reasoning of Lovequist
and extensively quoted Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
126. 379 Mass. at 9, 393 N.E.2d at 860.
127. Id at 18, 393 N.E.2d at 865.
128. Id
129. Id at 18-19 & 19 n.12, 393 N.E.2d at 865 & 865 n.12.
130. Id at 19,393 N.E.2d at 866.
131. Id at 20,393 N.E.2d at 866.
132. Id
133. Id at 20-21, 393 N.E.2d at 866. It was not clear, however, whether the ap
praisal reflected expectations of development.'
134. Id at 20, 393 N.E.2d at 866.
135. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2134, 427 N.E.2d 750.
136. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 105 (West Supp. 1981).
137. Id at ch. 131, § 40A (West Supp. 1981).
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City.138 The Moskow court focused on two points: That "diminu
tion in value" is not in itself a taking 139 and that the value of the
owner's property as a whole must be considered, not merely the
value of the restricted portion. 140
In Moskow, plaintiff owned about seven and one-half acres of
land in densely developed Newton. 141 The Commonwealth's restric
tive order limited use of about four acres to recreation, wharves and
other boating uses, and utility lines. 142 The trial court determined
the restrictive order confiscatory, in part because without the restric
tion plaintiff could have subdivided the land into eight lotS. 143 The
supreme judicial court, however, found that the residual utility of the
land as a site for one, single family dwel.liri.g presented a "sufficient
practical use to prevent the wetland restrictions from constituting a
taking."I44 It is worth noting that, once again, "[t]he plaintiff offered
no evidence which showed that he suffered an actual financial loss as
a result of the restrictions."145
The floodplain protection byiaw considered in Turnpike Re
alty 146 had three purposes: To protect the owner's land; to protect
upstream and downstream land; and to protect "the entire commu
nity from individual choices of land use which require subsequent
public expenditures for public works and disaster relief."147 The
third purpose, which might be objectionable to those who believe
that a community cannot use the zoning power simply to avoid pub
lic expenditures,148 was not discussed in Turnpike Realty. The court,
however, did approve the bylaw. In view of this distinction, it is
interesting that the Moskow court extended the principle of the Ded
ham bylaw to the inland wetlands restriction act which, it stated,
. "helps society avoid the relief expenditures connected with flooding
138. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
139. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2137-38 n.3, 427 N.E.2d at 753 n.3.
140. Id at 2137, 427 N.E.2d at 753.
141. Id at 2135, 427 N.E.2d at 751.
142. Id at 2135-36, 427 N.E.2d at 752.
143. Id at 2137, 427 N.E.2d at 752.
144. Id, 427 N.E.2d at 753 (citing Lovequist, 379 Mass. 7, 393 N.E.2d 866 (1979».
145. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2137-38 n.3, 427 N.E.2d at 753 n.3.
146. Turnpike Realty, 362 Mass. at 227, 284 N.E.2d at 896.
147. 362 Mass. at 228, 284 N.E.2d at 896.
148. See e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (town zoning must pro
vide for a fair share of low-cost housing despite local costs); Simon v. Needham, 311
Mass. 560, 565, 42 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1942) (zoning bylaws cannot be adopted for the
purpose of setting up a barrier against the infiux of thrifty and respectable citizens).
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and pollution control."149
E. Further Evidence on the Public Trust in Tidal Lands

State and federal laws have given special protection to areas
subject to the "public trust" doctrine, ISO especially coastal areas be
low mean high or, in Massachusetts, mean low tidal lines. The pub
lic trust was the basis of the famous Just v. Marinette Co. ,151 in which
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a prohibition on the filling of a
freshwater coastal marsh. The court held that as the shorelands of
Wisconsin were held under a public trust to protect navigable wa
ters, an owner of such land could not claim compensation for gov
ernment exercise of a servitude that interfered with his private use. IS2
Similarly, in Zabel v. Tabb,ls3 the Fifth Circuit held that the federal
servitude to which coastal areas lS4 are subject also bars any compen
sation to landowners affected by restrictions on the use of such
land. ISS
In Massachusetts, the public trust over areas below mean low
water level has developed over a period of many years: IS6 The issue
has been brought into prominence by the dispute over title to filled
land in the valuable Boston harbor area. IS7 Most recently the
supreme judicial court has declared that "[a]s to submerged lands
... no littoral landowner or anyone else has any special rights un
less granted them by the Legislature."ls8 The disposition of such
lands by the legislature must be for a public purpose only.ls9 Thus,
the issue is of continued interest in the Commonwealth.
149. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2139 n.4, 427 N.E.2d at 754 n.4.
150. For a general discussion of the "public trust" doctrine, see Dawson, supra
note 7, at 781-90.
151. 56 Wis. 2d 7,201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). See also Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124,
130, 336 A.2d 239, 243, (1972) (citing Just in upholding prohibition of fill in a tidal
wetland).
152. 56 Wis. 2d at 19,201 N.W.2d at 769.
153. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
154. In Zabel, the coastal area in question was a Florida mangrove swamp. Id. at
215.
155. Id.
156. For a discussion of the early history of "public trust" doctrine in Massachu
setts, see Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851); Dawson, supra note 7, at
781-85.
157. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 214,
374 N.E.2d 598 (1978), affd, 378 Mass. 629, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).
158. Opinion of the Justices, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1361, 1369, 424 N.E.2d 1092,
1099;
i59. Id. at 1371, 424 N.E.2d at 1100.
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In Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 160 the Florida Supreme
Court gave powerful expression to the public trust in protecting
coastal mangrove swamps. Estuary owned approximately 6,500
acres of land on the southwest coast, less than ten percent of which
was nonwetlands. 161 It sought to convert 1,800 acres of black man
groves, adjacent to 2,800 acres of tidal red mangroves, into a large
residential and commercial center. 162 The local board of county
commissioners and the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Com
mission refused to allow the project, on the grounds of degradation
. of adjacent bays. 163 The court upheld the denial, citing Just and not
ing the "close proximity of the land in question to navigable waters
which the state holds in trust for the public."I64
In considering taking, the Graham court emphasized two points.
First, it pointed out that the land was bought by Estuary with "full
knowledge that part of it was totally unsuitable for development."165
Second, the court distinguished other Florida cases in which land
owners had prevailed because "all of the owners' lands were sub
merged and were totally useless without the right to fill them."166
Estuary's land, however, was "not entirely submerged."167 Further
more, Estuary's claim that it would make no beneficial use of the
nonsubmerged part of its property was "supported mainly by the
self-serving testimony of the president of Estuary . . . ."168 The
company "offered no independent evidence to support this conten
tion."169 In spite of the ninety-to-ten ratio between regulated and
unregulated land, the "residual use" argument once again was de
cided in favor of the regulators, in part because of the absence of
competent evidence of total deprivation of practical use.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite claims of diminished land value, recent Massachusetts
cases show the continued force of the Turnpike Realty doctrine in
160. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
161. Id at 1376.
162. Id
163. Id at 1376-77.
164. Id at 1382.
165. Id This reasoning would apply equally well to anyone buying a Massachu
setts wetland, especially land subject to recorded restrictions under any of the three wet
lands laws or the Scenic Rivers Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 17A (West 1981).
166. 399 So. 2d at 1381.
167. Id
168. Id at 1382.
169. Id
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upholding regulation of floodplains and wetlands, providing that the
regulation is applied properly to the land and the owner fails to
prove that the property has no residual practical value. Courts gen
erally are becoming more knowledgeable about the ecological value
of wetlands, especially coastal marshes, and the hazards from devel
opment of floodplains. A strong minority surge of support for the
position that compensation should accompany regulation makes it
more imperative than ever that some practical use of the land, how
ever reduced, be left to the landowner.

